The Doctrine of Original Sin as Held by the Church, Both Before and After the Reformation

[By Archibald Alexander.] Although, as has been shown in a former article, the Pelagian doctrines respecting original sin were condemned by councils and popes, yet the heresy was not soon extinguished; but was in whole or in part adopted by many learned and ingenious men. To many, the opinions of Augustine appeared harsh, and hardly reconcilable with moral agency and human accountableness. They, therefore, endeavoured to strike out a middle course between the rigid doctrines of Augustine and the unscriptural opinions of Pelagius. This led to the adoption of an intermediate system, which obtained the denomination of semi-Pelagianism; and as these views seem to have been generally received about Marseilles, in the south of France, the abettors of this theory were very commonly called Massilienses . Augustine entered also into this controversy, and carried on a correspondence on the subject with Prosper and Hilary, two learned men of that region; the former of whom ardently opposed the semi-Pelagians, while the latter was inclined to favour them. By degrees, however, the public attention was called off from this subject. The darkness and confusion produced by the incursion of the northern bar- barians took away all opportunity and disposition to discuss those abstruse matters. Ages of ignorance succeeded, which have emphatically been called “the dark ages.” Superstition advanced, indeed, with rapid strides, but doctrinal investigation was neglected; or degenerated into mere logomachies, or useless thorny disputations.

We shall therefore pass over this long dark period with this slight notice, and will proceed to take a survey of the period antecedent to the reformation; and endeavour to ascertain the opinions of some of those acute and metaphysical men, denominated schoolmen . It has become customary for almost all classes of modern writers to treat the scholastic theology with sovereign contempt; and this often without any adequate knowledge of the system which they contemn. It is true, these ingenious men often exhausted their energies and lost their labour by a vain attempt to fathom an abyss: but it would surprise some modern metaphysicians and theologians to learn how exactly they themselves are running in the track, and pursuing the very footsteps of these despised schoolmen.

Our first object, therefore, will be to lay before the reader a brief abstract of the discussions of the angelical doctor, St Thomas Aquinas, on the subject of original sin. The subject is treated in the eighty-second question of his second book.

On this subject he starts four queries. 1. “Whether original sin is a habit? 2. Whether original sin is one , in man? 3. Whether it consists in concupiscence? 4. Whether it exists in an equal degree in all?”

This author, in his vast work, entitled Summa Theologiae, invariably commences his discussion by briefly stating some arguments on each side of the question.

On the first question proposed above, he brings forward the following objections to the affirmative. 1. “Original sin consists in the privation of original righteousness, as is declared by Anselm; but a privation is not a habit, therefore original sin is not a habit.” 2. “Actual sin is more deserving of blame than original sin, because it possesses more of a voluntary nature; but a mere habit of actual sin is not chargeable with guilt; for if it were, then a man would be guilty of sin all the time he was asleep. Original sin therefore is not a habit.” 3. “Besides, in evil, the act always precedes the habit; for no evil habit is ever infused, but always acquired: but no act precedes original sin; therefore original sin is not a habit.

“But, on the other hand, Augustine declares that infants are the subjects of concupiscence; but they are not so in regard to the act; therefore original sin in them must be a habit.”

The conclusion which he draws from a view of both sides of the question, is the following: “Original sin is a habit, but not in the same way as knowledge is a habit; but it is a certain inordinate condition of nature, and a debility consequent on the privation of original righteousness,” which proposition he proceeds to explain as follows: “The word habit is taken in a two-fold sense; in the first, it signifies a power by which one is inclined to act; in this sense, knowledge and virtue are called habits: but in the other sense, habit is a disposition or state of nature composed of many particulars, according to which nature is in a condition favourable or unfavourable for any given exercise. Now, according to the first sense of the word, original sin is not a habit, but according to the second it is; just as we speak of health as a good habit or state of the body; and sickness as the contrary. Original sin may, therefore, be described to be “a certain inordinate condition or disposition proceeding from the loss of harmony in the exercise of the moral powers, in which harmony original righteousness consisted: just as sickness is a certain disordered state of the body and its functions, arising from the loss of that equal temperament in which health consists. On account of this analogy, original sin is often called “a disease of the mind.”

And as in bodily sickness, there is not a mere privation of that regular state and action in which health consists, but also an inordinate disposition, so also, original sin includes both a privation of original righteousness, and a disorder of the faculties of the mind: it is not, therefore, merely a privation, but is also a corrupt habit.”

“Again, as actual sin consists in the irregularity of our moral exercises, and original sin in the inordinate disposition of our nature, original sin may have the true nature and ill-desert of sin; but such an inordinate condition of the soul has not the nature of an act, but of a habit; therefore, original and actual sin are distinct, although both are connected with ill-desert.”

But in regard to the third objection, stated above, in which it was alleged, that in evil, acts must precede the habit, as there can be no infusion of evil habits, “I would observe,” says he, “that it has already been stated, that original sin does not consist in that kind of a habit in which there is a power inclining us to act; for although from original sin there does follow an inclination to inordinate action, yet not directly, but indirectly; namely, by the removal of original righteousness, by which these inordinate motions were restrained, and every thing preserved in its regular condition: just as in the case of bodily sickness there follows indirectly an inclination to irregular bodily motions. Original sin, therefore, ought not to be considered ‘an infused habit,’ nor a habit acquired by repeated acts, but an innate disposition derived from the voluntary transgression of the first man.”