A Discourse Delivered Before His Excellency Thomas Chittenden

IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 9th October, 1795.

ON MOTION, RESOLVED,

THAT JONATHAN ROBINSON, Esq. Dr. ELDERKIN, and Col. SHELDON, be a Committee to wait on the Rev. AS A BURTON, return him the thanks of this House, for the Sermon by him delivered on Election Day, and request a Copy for the Press.

Extract from the Journals.

(Attest,) R. WHITNEY, Clerk.

AN ELECTION SERMON.

For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels.

PHILOSOPHERS, for the purpose of reasoning and communicating their ideas to better advantage, have divided all existences into classes. These divisions are denominated by such general terms, as a genus, species, order, and rank of beings. Matter is a general term, including all the ideas, which belong, in common, to all material existences. They then subdivide material existence into several species. Inanimate existence constitutes one, vegetable another, and animals a third species, rising, by way of gradation, from the lowest to the highest in kind. Spirit is also a general common name of all spiritual beings, which, however, are divided into different classes, as p. 4divine, angelic, and human. The soul is a spiritual existence; men, therefore, form one, and the angels another and higher rank. Whatever the specific difference between angels and men may be, the text places us as but little below them, and at the head of all other creatures in this world. Man is made, (for he is the person meant in the text,) a little lower than the angels. Indeed, the analogy observable in all the works of God, together with the text, afford us reasons to believe, that the angels rise in different ranks one above another, till at last the Almighty appears infinitely above the whole, as the superior head of all principality and power, or of all ranks in the universe.

ALL beings rank according to their real dignity and worth. Different orders of creatures ought, therefore, to rise, by easy gradations, men above animals, and angels above men, in proportion to their different degrees of real dignity and value. By the same rule, all the states and kingdoms of the earth ought to rank themselves. And all beings ought to employ all their powers agreeably to, and uniformly in, the stations assigned them, by the Author of their existence.

ASCERTAINING clearly the real value of things in general, and of those properties in particular which are the most valuable, will teach men their real worth, and the rank they sustain, and prepare the way to show how the p. 5improvement of the mind will contribute to the good of society.

p. 5LET it then be shewn,

I. WHAT constitutes the real worth of beings in general.

THE value of all things is either intrinsic or relative. The reason why any thing is esteemed, is, on account of the immediate pleasure which it affords, and the happiness it may hereafter produce. As all happiness presupposes a pleasing object, those which suit the relish of the mind may be termed the sources of happiness. Those things then, which, of themselves, afford immediate pleasure, have intrinsic value; but those things which please only when viewed as necessary means to happiness hereafter, have a relative value. Hence, some kinds of fruit are valued on account of the immediate pleasure which they afford, and also, for the sake of some future good to which they are a necessary mean, by restoring health, nourishing the body, and procuring other things of higher gratification. There are some things, which, in themselves, afford no satisfaction; these are valued only as means to happiness hereafter. It is in this relative view that money is so highly esteemed; because it serves as a mean to procure most of the sources of happiness in the present life. Hence, some things have p. 6only a relative, and others have both a relative and an intrinsic value.

FURTHERMORE, although some things give immediate gratification, yet, if they will hereafter destroy our happin◊◊◊ 〈…〉 on the whole valuable. Hence, those things only will be esteemed by any person on the whole as valuable, which give him more pleasure than pain. And those things only which on the whole produce more good than evil, ought to be esteemed by us as being really valuable to society. And by the same rule, in estimating the worth of things, we ought not to consider any thing as valuable on the whole, only that which will finally and forever issue in the highest happiness of the universe. As all persons ought to seek the good of society, so all societies ought to seek the good of the universe: And as the good of each of these is inseparably connected, every person by seeking the highest good of the one, promotes the highest good of the other. Hence, the highest good or happiness of the moral system, is the standard by which we are to estimate the worth of every thing. According to this standard, the following are the only reasons why any existences, with their properties, are valuable. (1.) Because some of them are capable of enjoying the highest good. A capacity to enjoy good is valuable on this very account. Vessels in daily use, are esteemed on account of what they receive p. 7and contain. In this view, the worth of any being is great, in proportion to the sum of happiness he i◊ capable of enjoying during his existence. (2.) Because they are a means of the increase and diffusion of happiness. An existence is valuable, if it is a means of promoting, although it is not capable of enjoying happiness. In this view, the intrinsic and relative value of all things is greater or less, in 〈…〉 they promote the highest good of the moral system. Hence, those things which serve as means to happiness, without any capacity to enjoy it, have not that degree of worth those beings have who are capable both of enjoying and increasing it.

p. 7THIS leads me to inquire,

II. WHAT those faculties or properties in any being are in particular, which are the most valuable?