Discussions, Vol. III: Philosophical

that this profession must have fearful influence in forming the moral opinions of the community. The concern which the country has in their professional integrity, and in their righteous and truthful exercise of these vast powers, is analogous to that which the church has in the oiihodoxy of her ministers. Kor are these influences of the legal profession limited to things secular ; for the domains of morals and religion so intermingle that the moral condition of a people, as to the duties of righteousness between man and man, greatly influences their state towards God. It may well be doubted whether an acute and unprincipled bar does not do more to corrupt and ruin many communities than the pulpit does to sanctify and save them. These things at once justify the introduction of the topic into these discussions, and challenge the attention of Christian lawyers and readers to its great importance.

anj opinion of the true merits of the case, for this is the function of the judge and jury ; that the advocate's office, to perform which faithfully he is even sworn, is to present his client's cause in the most favorable light which his skill and knowledge of law will enable him to throw around it ; and that if this should be more favorable than truth and justice approve, this is no concern of his, but of the advocate of the opposite party, who has equal obligation and opportunity to correct the picture ; that not the advocate himself, but the judge and jury who sit as umpires, are responsible for the righteousness of the final verdict ; that, according to the conception of the EngHsh law, a court is but a debating society, in which the advocates of plaintiflfs and defendants are but the counterpoises, whose only function is the almost mechanical, or, at least, the merely intellectual one of pressing down each one his own scale, while an impartial judge holds the balance ; that this artificial scheme is found by a sound experience to be — not, indeed, perfect — but, on the whole, the most accurate way to secure just verdicts in the main, and that this fact is the sufficient moral defence of the system."

common wealth, does not give a graver aspect to the errors of their theory of action. It is not that the bar is more immoral than commerce or agriculture ; but that, if the bar acts on an immoral theory, it is so much more mischievous. Xor, again, is it asserted that the individual advocate is necessarily a vicious man, because the professional idea into which he is betrayed is a vicious one. It is Lot doubted that many men of social honor act out the idea of theu' office above described, who, if they were convinced of its error, would repudiate it conscientiously. It is not questioned that the professional intercourse of lawyers with each other is usually courteous, generous and fraternal, above most of the secular professions ; that many magnanimous cases exist where peaceful counsels are given by them to augrj litigants, so as to prevent controversies which would be extremely profitable to the advocates, if prosecuted ; that there is no class of worldly men who usually respond more nobly to the claims of beneficence than lawyers ; and that they deserve usually their social position in the front rank of the respectable classes. But, to recur to the truth already suggested, it should be remembered that their profession is not merely commercial or pecuniary in its concernments ; it is intellectual and moral ; it affects not only the interests but the virtues oi the people : lawj'ers are their leaders and moral teachers. Therefore, they act under higher responsibilities than the mere man of dollars, and should be satisfied only by a higher and better standard. The merchant may, perhaps, law^fully determine his place of residence by regard to his profits : the preacher of the gospel may not ; and should he do so, he would be held as recreant to his obligations. ^TLj this difference ? In like manner we may argue that should the lawyer act on a moral standard no higher than that of the mere reputable man of traffic, he would violate the obligations of his more responsible profession. But if this were not so, the obvious remark remains, that, if aU other secular professions act unscrupulously, this is no standard, and no justification for the bar: to "measiu'e oui'selves by ourselves, and compare ourselves among ourselves is not wise." The only question with the answer to which time integrity will satisfy itself, is this: ichether the ahi/i^e theory of an advocates functions is rnm^ally right.

be justly asked, whether there are not inequalities in the skill and diligence of advocates, and whether the wealth which would give to the rich suitor so unjust an advantage over his poor adversary, if they pleaded their causes in person, does not, in fact, give an equally unjust advantage, in the numbers and. ability of the counsel it enables him to secure, when those counsel are permitted to urge his cause beyond their own private convictions of its merits. We do not, of course, dream of any state of things in which professional advocates can be dispensed with Avholly ; minors, females, persons of feeble intellects, must have them in some form. But it is verj- doubtful whether as equitable resiilts would not be reached in the main, were all other suitors, except the classes we have mentioned, obliged to appear per se, extreme as such a usage would be, as those reached under our present system. Cases are continually occiniing, in which verdicts are obtained contrary to right, in virtue of inequalities in the members, reputation, talents, or zeal of opposing counsel, or of the untoward prejudices under which one party has to struggle. Especially is this assertion true of a multitude of cases in which the commonwealth is a party ; for when this unscrupulous theory of an advocate's functions is adopted, it is universally found that the personal client on the one side is served with a different kind of zeal and perseverance from that exerted on the other side in behalf of that distant, imaginary, and vague personality, the State. This theory, therefore, probably does as much to create unfair inequalities as to correct them. And it usually happens that the advocate derives his warmth, his strongest arguments, and most telling points, from his conversations with the eager client, whom self-interest has impelled to view the controversy with all the force of a thoroughly aroused mind ; that, in a word, the client does more to make the speech effective than his counsel.