Lex, Rex: The Law and the Prince

p. 1QUEST. I. In what sense Government is from God?

I Reduce all that I am to speak of the power of Kings, to the Author or efficient. 2. The matter or subject. 3. The form or power. 4. The end and fruit of their Government; And 5. to some cases of resistance. Hence,

Quest. I. Whether Government be warranted by a divine Law?

The question is, either of Government in generall, or of the particular species of Government; such as are Government by one only, called Monarchy; the Government by some chief leading men, named Aristocracie; the Government by the people, going under the name of Democracie. 2. We cannot but put difference betwixt the institution of the Office, to wit, Government, and the designation of person, or persons to the Office. 3. What is warranted by the direction of natures light, is warranted by the Law of nature, and consequently by a divine Law; for who can deny the Law of nature to be a divine Law?

That power of Government in generall must be from God: [How Government is from God.] I make good, 1. Because, Rom. 13.—1. there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God. 2. God commandeth obedience, and so subjection of conscience to powers, Rom. 13.5. Wherefore we must be subject not onely for wrath (or civill punishment) but for conscience sake, 1 Pet. 2.13. Submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake▪ whether it be to the King as Supreme, &c. Now God onely by a divine Law can lay a band p. 2of subjection on the conscience, tying men to guilt, and punishment, if they transgr◊sse.

[Civill power in the root immediately from God.] 2. Conclus. All civill power is immediately from God in its root. In that, 1. God hath made man a sociall creature, and one who inclineth to be governed by man; then certainly, he must have put this power in mans nature: so are we by good reason taught by [Aristot. polit. l. 1. c. 2.] Aristotle.

2. God and nature intendeth the policie and peace of mankinde, then must God and nature have given to mankinde, a power to compasse this end; and this must be a power of Government. I see not then why John Prelate, Master Maxwel the excommunicate P. of Rosse, who speak◊th in the name [Sacro sanc. reg. majestas, c. 1. p. 1.] of I. Armagh, had reason to say, That he feared that we fancied, that the Government of Superiours was onely for the more perfit▪ but have no Authoritie over or above the perfit, N◊c Rex, nec Lex, justo posita. He might have imputed this to the Brasilians, who teach, That every single man hath the power of the sword to revenge his own injuries, as [Molina to. • . de justit. 〈◊〉 . 22.] Molina saith.

p. 2QUEST. II. Whether or not, Government be warranted by the Law of nature.

AS domestick societie is by natures instinct, so is civill societie naturall, in radice, in the root, and voluntary, in modo, in the manner of coalescing. Politick power of Government, agreeth not to man, singly, as one man, except in that root of reasonable nature; but supposing that men be combined in societies, or that one family cannot contain a societie, it is naturall, that they joyn in a civill societie, though the manner of Union in a politick body; as [Bodin. de rep. l. 1 c. 6.] Bodine saith, be voluntary, Gen. 10.10. Gen. 15.7. and [Suarez to. 1. de legib. l. 3. c. 3.] Suarez saith, That a power of making Laws, is given by God as a property flowing from nature, Qui dat formam, dat consequ◊ntia ad formam, Not by any speciall action or grant, different from creation, nor will he have it to result from nature, while men be united into one politick body: which Union being made, that power followeth without any new action of the will,

[Civill societie how naturall.] We are to distinguish betwixt a power of Government, and a power of Government by Magistracy. That we defend our selves from violence by violence, is a consequent of unbroken and sin-lesse nature; but that we defend our selves by devolving our power over in the hands of one, or more Rulers, seemeth rather positively morall, then naturall, except that it is naturall for the childe to expect p. 3help against violence, from his father: For which cause I judge that learned Senator [Vasquez illust. quae t. l. 1. c. 41. num. 28, 29.] Ferdinandus Vasquius said well, [Power of Government, and of Government by Magistrates disterent.] That Princedom, Empire, Kingdom, or Iurisdiction hath its rise from a positive and secundary law of Nations, and not from the law of pure Nature. [L. 2. in princ. F. de iust. & jur. & in princ. Iust. Cod. tit. c. jus nat. 1. disp.] The Law saith, there is no law of Nature agreeing to all living creatures for superiority; for by no reason in Nature, hath a Boar dominion over a Boar, a Lyon over a Lyon, a Dragon over a Dragon, a Bull over a Bull; And if all Men be born equally free (as I hope to prove) there is no reason in Nature, why one Man should be King and Lord over another; therefore while I be otherwise taught by the forecasten Prelate Maxwell, I conceive all jurisdiction of Man over Man, to be as it were Artificiall and Positive, and that it inferreth some servitude, whereof Nature from the womb hath freed us, if you except that subjection of children to parents, and the wife to the husband; and the [Dominium est jus quoddam. l. fin. ad med. C. de long. temp. prest. l. qui usum fert. Civil subjection formally not natures Law.] Law saith, De jure gentium secundarius est omnis principatus. 2. This also the Scripture proveth, while as the exalting of Saul or David above their Brethren to be Kings, and Captains of the Lords people, is ascribed, not to Nature, (for King and Beggar spring of one clay-mettall) but to an act of Divine bounty and grace, above Nature, so Psal. 78.70, 71. He took David from following the Ewes, and made him King and feeder of his people, 1 Sam. 13.13.