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An Examination of President Edwards's Enquiry on Freedom of Will

James Dana 1770
Dana challenges Edwards's theory of volition and moral necessity, arguing that Edwards's principles, though theoretically sound, prove impractical.

EEBO-TCP N09106 (TEI), original spelling, printed page numbers. STC/Wing Evans 11623

From the text

The opening of the work as printed, in the spelling of this edition.

INTRODUCTION, Exhibiting a general view of Mr. Edwards's scheme; with the design and method proposed in these remarks.

IT is quite beside the purpose of the following remarks to enquire, Whether the general scheme of doctrine Mr. Edwards intended to establish in his enquiry be rational and scriptural. It is only the foundation principle we aim to consider: The system built hereupon, whether true or false, is not, by the generality of Calvinistic Divines, made to depend on the same basis.

THE principal subject of the book before us is, 'What determines the will?' And through the whole performance great pains is taken to demonstrate, that moral necessity and liberty are convertible terms. The perplexity, confusion, and uncertainty, which disquisitions of this sort are attended with, is sufficiently known. We shall endeavour to keep out of the clouds as much as the nature of the subject will admit.

'THE position of chief importance,' we are told is, That the will is necessarily determined by the strongest motive; meaning by the strongest motive 'that, which, in the mind's present view, hath the greatest appearance of good.' 'Every act of the will hath a certain fixed connection herewith, and depends hereupon, as it's cause— p. xor the ground and reason of it.' [Enquiry part I. sect. 2.] In support of which it is said, that 'nothing ever comes to pass without a proportionable cause—that the acts of the will, and material things, have a like necessary dependance on a cause without themselves—that moral causes may be causes in as proper a sense as any causes whatever—and moral necessity may be as absolute as natural.' [Enquiry p 30, 40, 48, 58, 52, 66, and passim.]

INDEED, by the word cause Mr. Edwards explains himself to mean, not only 'that which hath a positive efficiency, or influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pass;' but 'sometimes any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, in whole, or in part, why it is rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise.' [Enquiry p. 57, 58, 9.] At the same time he asserts, that every act of the will is an 'effect necessarily dependent and consequent on a cause, which he calls an efficient cause; to whose' determination and command volition is as much subject, as the motions of the hands and feet to the volitions which determine and command them—that the acts of the will are as 'passive with respect to the antecedent cause, ground, or reason of them.' [P. 183, 184.] He maintains, upon the whole, an universal necessity—that all beings, all events, the manner and all the circumstances of things are necessarily determined. Yet be professeth himself an advocate for liberty, and labours a distinction between natural and p. ximoral necessity, which distinction he apprehends important—natural necessity being inconsistent with praise or blame, while moral is not. The liberty he admits is, however, merely external, and the result of necessity in the mind.

p. xiTHIS is a general idea of his plan, so far as it will fall under present consideration. In pursuing our remarks on which, we shall,

FIRST, Examine the supposed connection of volition with the highest motive.

SECONDLY, The indissoluble connection of moral causes and effects.

THIRDLY, Shew that internal, moral liberty, as distinguished from external, or natural belongs to moral agents: Or admitting Mr. Edwards's scheme of necessity to be true in theory, it is not applicable to practice. It is also proposed to add, in an appendix, a specimen of coincidence between Mr. Edwards and some celebrated infidels, antient and modern.

N. B. We have made use of the London edition. Wherever the reader finds particular pages referred to by numerical figures inclosed in a parenthesis, such place in Mr. Edwards's enquiry is meant, unless notice is given of our refering to some other author.

SECT. I. Mr. Edwards hath not shewn wherein the energy of motive consists.

THE enquiry in this place is not, Whether the highest motive hath always a causal influence on the will? But, admitting this to be the case, what it is that causeth any supposed motive to be highest in the mind's view? wherein doth its energy, or power consist? In the next section, we shall examine, whether the will is indeed determined, in every act, by the highest motive.

WHEN, between two or more objects in the mind's view, one appears most agreable; (from whatever cause,) this appearance is the highest or strongest motive, according to our author. Now as there is a manifest difference between an object's actually appearing most agreable, and the cause of this appearance; the proper question, in the first place, is, What is the ground, reason, or cause of the agreable appearance itself. For admitting the strongest motive to be the more immediate cause of volition, how doth this prove that it is the original cause? Whence is it that any proposed object hath the greatest appearance of good? From what cause? Hither we must ultimately p. 2recur for the ground of volition; [Possibly not stop here.] Till the answer to this question is found, the original ground of volition is not discovered. For if every circumstance of things hath an answerable cause, that there is a cause why this or that motive is highest. ['In the question, What determines the will? it is taken for granted, that something determines it. And the controversy on this head is, where the foundation of the will's determination is,' (p. 56.) Mr Edwards saith expresly, 'That the act of volition itself (or the will) is always determined by that in the mind's view of an object, which causes it to appear most agreable.' (p. 12) Here, then, is the FOUNDATION of the will's determination. Mr. Edwards's business, therefore, according to his own state of the question, was, to point out what causeth an object to appear most agreable. For if that which CAUSETH this appearance be the real cause of volition, then the agreable appearance ITSELF cannot be the cause. The agreable appearance, or highest motive, as he observes, is nothing distinct from volition, but the very thing, as will be particularly shewn in the next section. We would here just hint, by the way, that Mr. Edwards hath given ample testimony against 'the position of chief importance in his discourse.' For that the highest motive doth not always determine volition, is pretty apparent, if it is always determined by that in or about an object which causeth it to be, and appear, most agreable. The will, in no instance whatsoever, is determined by the agreable appearance, but by the cause of such appearance.]

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Contents

  1. PREFACE.
  2. INTRODUCTION, Exhibiting a general view of Mr. Edwards's scheme; with the design and…
  3. SECT. I. Mr. Edwards hath not shewn wherein the energy of motive…p. 2
  4. SECT. II. The will not necessarily determined by the strongest Motive.p. 10
  5. SECT. III. External Action or Conduct not determined by the Will…p. 33
  6. PART II. An examination of Mr. Edwards's doctrine respecting the indissoluble connection…p. 36
  7. SECT. I. Whether the will be necessarily determined by an extrinsic…p. 43
  8. SECT. II. Whether the will be necessarily determined by an intrinsic…p. 51
  9. SECT. III. Upon Mr. Edwards's own Scheme, there cannot be natural…p. 60
  10. SECT. IV. Of GOD's being the Author of Sin, upon Mr. Edwards's Scheme…p. 64
  11. SECT. V. On the supposed Advantage of moral Evil to the Universe.p. 72
  12. SECT. VI. Containing general Observations and Reflections on the…p. 80
  13. PART III. Shewing that internal moral Liberty, as distinguished from external or natural…p. 87
  14. SECT. I. Internal Liberty belongs to moral Agents.p. 87
  15. SECT. II. Internal moral liberty, as distinct from external…p. 110
  16. SECT. III. Allowing Mr. Edwards's scheme of necessity to be true in…p. 120
  17. THE APPENDIX. Exhibiting a specimen of coincidence between the principles of Mr.…p. 128
  18. SPINOZA.p. 132
  19. EDWARDS.p. 134

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