Primary Source

Examination of President Edwards's Enquiry on Freedom of Will

James Dana 1773
Dana extensively critiques Edwards's freedom of will doctrine, examining volition, necessity, evil, and foreknowledge with detailed philosophical analysis.

EEBO-TCP N10031 (TEI), original spelling, printed page numbers. STC/Wing Evans 12746

From the text

The opening of the work as printed, in the spelling of this edition.

INTRODUCTION.

SOME things which were but just touched, or considered only in a general way, in the examination of Mr. Edwards, require a further and particular examination: And other things need a more distinct explanation: His denial of moral, rational liberty; his distinction of natural and moral necessity; attributing the origin of evil to the want or withdraw of divine assistance; seperating the obliquity of sin from its cause; are some of the points that require a further examination. And those that need a more distinct explanation are the doctrine of human liberty as maintained by the examiner, and the consistency thereof with admitting the operation of motives in the choice and determinations of moral agents.

The examiner hath the same opinion still of the intricacy of the subject as was expressed in his former publication, and means to proceed in it with caution and diffidence. If he may be so happy as to cast any light on the abstruse subject of liberty and necessity, or rescue it in any important respect from its obscurity, his time will not be ill-employed. But the main thing in view all along has been to vindicate the moral character of the Deity from the injurious representations, either of designing, or well-meaning but mistaken men.

p. viThe scheme of necessity, in opposition to self-determination, cannot, he thinks, be defended on the principles of revelation or theism, if this one thing be admitted, that God is not the cause of moral evil. If it be affirmed, that he is the efficient cause of it, his moral perfections are denied. If moral agents themselves are the efficient cause, this is to admit self-determination.

Some maintain only an hypothetic liberty. On their principles necessity may be tenable—provided there is neither holiness nor sin in the creation of God—no being worthy of moral complacence or displicence, praise or blame.

The examiner begs the reader to keep in mind this single question, Whether Mr. Edwards's doctrine makes God the efficient cause of all moral wickedness? He is himself clear in the affirmative of the question, or would not have undertaken to examine Mr. Edwards's book. If this should also be the reader's opinion, it is presum'd the scheme which contains or concludes in this will be rejected. To reduce a Christian writer to this is sufficient, without going any further. Nor will there be occasion to shew how different such a scheme is from the sentiments of those who have been esteemed orthodox in the purest times of the church: It is with no great propriety, that Mr. Edwards makes it the caption of almost every section, that his foundation principles are the doctrines of Calvinism; and the opposite Arminianism. Pelagianism, &c. Were it indeed so, what other purpose can this serve than to cast an odium, and fix a personal stigma? But in truth, when have Calvinists maintain'd, that the vicious wills of moral agents are derived from God, and unalterably fixed by his efficiency? that the first existence of sin arose from the witholding his influence and assistance? Should it also appear that Mr. Edwards's doctrine leaves no room for a distinction between rational and animal creatures in respect of liberty and agency—that it concludes in favour of the mechanism of the human mind, this is a basis on which Calvinists have not built their scheme of doctrine.

p. viIn some parts of the ensuing performance, the examiner hath been obliged to be more abstruse than was his own choice; some readers might otherwise have thought him p. viiwanting in respect to Mr. Edwards, whose book is repleat with such reasoning; abundant pains being taken this way to deduce his adversaries to absurdity. But whatever propriety there may be in opposing metaphysics to metaphysics, yet the examiner would assure the reader, he hath taken care not to substitute any metaphysics of his own for truth; but hath endeavoured to suggest some plain things on what he takes to be the real truth in the present debate. He desires the reader would excuse a few things that may appear abstruse, and hopes the greater part of what he hath written will be thought sufficiently clear, and adapted to do some good. The whole calls for the public candor, which he would not forfeit by writing with a sour temper.

He hath not been at all intimidated by the opinion or arguments of his remarker, who thinks

the grand pillars of Mr. Edwards's doctrine stand firm and unshaken.

Nor hath he any apology to make for undertaking to examine Mr. Edwards's book. Tis enough, that the examiner treated "this great man" with no disrepect in his first publication, and determines not to in the present.

SECTION I. On Self-determination.

WE shall first explain the doctrine of human liberty in the sense in which we maintain it. Secondly, Make a few cursory observations on Mr. Edwards's scheme of liberty.

Power, motion and agency are terms of various signification. The two first are frequently used in mechanics, and all of them may be applied to animal creatures. "Power may reside in a subject that is no agent; as in the case of physical or natural powers."

When we speak of the motions and revolutions of inanimate bodies, it may amount to the same thing at last, whether we attribute these to an established original law of nature, or to the constant agency of the Deity upon matter. The course of nature is the constitution of the author of nature. It is demonstrably not so fixed as to preclude special divine interposition, whereby the operation of second causes is suspended or counteracted. We cannot, indeed, determine how far this is the case. Many events may be brought about (at least in part) by second causes, which we may imagine belong to the head of special interpositions, over-ruling those causes. 'Tis difficult to ascertain the powers of nature, as well as those of moral agents.

There is a sense in which there is no power but of God. And if any chuse to say, that natural causes (so called) are really no cause at all; that God actuates all the powers of nature, and that from his energy every effect in the natural world proceeds, we have no objection to make. We only desire it may be remembered, that mechanic powers, the motions of inanimate bodies, bear no resemblance to, and give us no idea of, the powers of moral and accountable p. 10creatures. Shou'd one undertake to illustrate consciousness by the vibrations of a pendulum, it would not be more ridiculous than a pretence to explain the powers of human nature by the motions of the planets, the growth of vegetables, &c. These are so far from being any exemplification of moral agency, that they bear no likeness even to animal motion. For this is voluntary. And we presume it will not be said that voluntary motion is predicable of inanimate things—not even by those philosophers who have resembled the powers of moral nature to those of material bodies.

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Contents

  1. INTRODUCTION.
  2. SECTION I. On Self-determination.p. 10
  3. SECTION II. On the influence of motives in moral volitions.p. 31
  4. SECTION III. On necessity.p. 43
  5. SECTION IV. On the origin of evil.p. 58
  6. SECTION V. On the connection between the nature and cause of volition.p. 74
  7. SECTION VI. Moral evil not best for the world.p. 83
  8. SECTION VII. On Foreknowledge.p. 96
  9. SECTION VIII. On texts of scripture misconstrued.p. 106
  10. SECTION IX. Objections considered.p. 117
  11. SECTION X. On metaphysical reasoning. "The word metaphysic, according to vulgar use, is…p. 126
  12. SECTION XI. Recapitulation.p. 137
  13. STRICTURES on "an essay on moral agency:" (So called) Containing remarks on a late…p. 143

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