Freedom of the Will

SECTION I. Concerning the Nature of the Will.

IT may possibly be thought, that there is no great Need of going about to define or describe the Will; this Word being generally as well understood as any other Words we can use to explain it: And so perhaps it would be, had not Philosophers, Metaphysicians and Polemic Divines brought the Matter into Obscurity by the Things they have said of it. But since it is so, I think it may be of some Use, and will tend to the greater Clearness in the following Discourse, to say a few Things concerning it.

And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any metaphysical Refining) is plainly, That by which the Mind ch◊ses any Thing. The Faculty of the Will is that Faculty or Power or Principle of Mind by which it is capable of chusing: An Act of the Will is the same as an Act of Chusing or Choice.

p. 2If any think 'tis a more perfect Definition of the Will, to say, that it is that by which the Soul either chuses or refuses; I am content with it: tho' I think that 'tis enough to say, It's that by which the Soul chuses: For in every Act of Will whatsoever, the Mind chuses one Thing rather than another; it chuses something rather than the Contrary, or rather than the Want or Non-Existence of that Thing. So in every Act of Refusal, the Mind chuses the Absence of the Thing refused; The Positive and the Negative are set before the Mind for it's Choice, and it chuses the Negative; and the Mind's making it's Choice in that Case is properly the Act of the Will: The Will's determining between the two is a voluntary determining; but that is the same Thing as making a Choice. So that whatever Names we call the Act of the Will by, Chusing, Refusing, Approving, Disapproving, Liking, Disliking, Embracing, Rejecting, Determining, Directing, Commanding, Forbidding, Inclining or being averse, a being pleased or displeas'd with; all may be reduced to this of Chusing. For the Soul to act voluntarily, is evermore to act electively.

Mr. Locke [Human Understanding. Edit. 7. Vol. I. P. 147.] says, p. 2The Will signifies Nothing but a Power or Ability to prefer or chuse.

And in the foregoing Page says,

The Word Preferring seems best to express the Act of Volition;

But adds, that

it does it not precisely; For (says he) tho' a Man would prefer Flying to Walking, yet who can say he ever wills it?

But the Instance he mentions don't prove that there is any Thing else in Willing, but meerly Preferring: For it should be considered what is the next and immediate Object of the Will, with respect to a Man's Walking, or any other external Action; which is not his being removed from one Place to another; on the Earth, or thro' the Air; these are remoter Objects of Preference; but such or such an immediate Exertion of himself. The Thing nextly chosen or prefer'd when a Man wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a Place where he would be, but such an Exertion and Motion of his Legs and Feet &c. in order to it. And his willing such an Alteration in his Body in the present Moment, is nothing else but his chusing or preferring such an Alteration in his Body at such a Moment, or his liking it better than the Forbearance of it. And God has so made and establish'd the human Nature, the Soul being united to a Body in proper State, that the Soul preferring or chusing such an immediate Exertion or Alteration of the Body, such an Alteration instantaneously follows. There is nothing else p. 3in the Actings of my Mind, that I am conscious of while I walk, but only my preferring or chusing, thro' successive Moments, that there should be such Alterations of my external Sensations and Motions; together with a concurring habitual Expectation that it will be so; having ever found by Experience, that on such an immediate Preference, such Sensations and Motions do actually instantaneously, & constantly arise. But it is not so in the Case of Flying: Tho' a Man may be said remotely to chuse or prefer Flying; yet he don't chuse or prefer, incline to or desire, under Circumstances in View, any immediate Exertion of the Members of his Body in order to it; because he has no Expectation that he should obtain the desired End by any such Exertion; and he don't prefer or incline to any bodily Exertion or Effort under this apprehended Circumstance, of it's being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully distinguish the proper Objects of the several Acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and such-like Instances, that there is any Difference between Volition and Preference; or that a Man's chusing, liking best, or being best pleased with a Thing, are not the same with his willing that Thing; as they seem to be according to those general and more natural Notions of Men, according to which Language is formed. Thus an Act of the Will is commonly express'd by it's pleasing a Man to do thus or thus; and a Man's doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are the same Thing in common Speech.

The Will is perfectly distinguish'd from Desire; which in the very same Action may have a quite contrary Tendency from that which our Wills set us upon. A Man (says he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use Perswasions to another, which, at the same Time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this Case 'tis plain the Will and Desire run counter.

I don't suppose, that Will and Desire are Words of precisely the same Signification: Will seems to be a Word of a more general Signification, extending to Things present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present Situation and Posture, suppose sitting still, or having my Eyes open, and so may will it. …