Conscience and Its Power and Cases

p. 1CHAP. I. The definition of Conscience.

THe Conscience of man (for I doe not intend to treat of the Conscience of Angels) Is a mans judgement of himselfe, according to the judgement of God of him. Esai, 5. 3. Iudge I pray you betweene me and my vineyard: 1 Cor. 11. 31. If we would judge our selues, wee should not be judged, &c.

1 I call Conscience Iudgement, First, to shew that it belongs to the Understanding, not to the Will. The very name of Conscience sheweth it to bee so. But this proveth it, because all those actions, which in the Scriptures are attributed to mans Conscience, doe properly belong to the reasonable power, or faculty; though the Will by some act or inclination can both command the Vnderstanding to judge, and also follow that judgement. This inclination, by some, is called Conscience; by others, a part of Conscience; but not rightly.

2 Conscience being referred to judgement, it is distinguished from the bare apprehension of truth. For Conscience p. 2doth alwaies suppose an assent that is firme and setled.

3 By the definition of Conscience, it appeareth that Conscience is not a contemplatiue judgement, whereby truth is simply discerned from falsehood: but a practicall judgement, by which, that which a man knoweth is particularly applyed to that which is either good or evill to him, to the end that it may be a rule within him to direct his will. [Whether Conscience be a Facultie, Habit, or Act.]

Seeing that this name of judgement, is sometimes taken for a power and faculty, sometimes for an habit, sometimes for an act; this question ariseth, to which of all these Conscience is properly.

4 The most graue Divine, William Perkins, who onely of our Countreymen hath set foorth a peculiar Treatise of Conscience, doth place it among Faculties; and he doth so define it, as he putteth for the generall nature of it a part of the Understanding, that is to say, as he explaines himselfe, A naturall power or facultie. He giues this reason of his opinion, namely, because the act of Accusing, Comforting, Terrifying, &c. cannot bee ascribed to the Conscience, if it selfe were an act. Put this reason is weake: because in the Scriptures such kindes of effects are attributed to the thoughts themselues, which undoubtedly are acts. Rom. 2. 15. Their thoughts Accusing one another, or Excusing. The reason is, because things done, are the effects not onely of the Mover, but also of the motiō it selfe. Besides, Master Perkins maketh Conscience, Vnderstanding, Opinion, Knowledge, Faith, and Prudence, to be of one kind or sort; but none would define these so, as that they should be taken for distinct faculties of the soule.

p. 25 Some of the Schoolemen will have Conscience p. 3to be an habit: as Scotus, Bonaventure, Durand. Which though it might be granted of some part; or of the principles of Conscience: yet it cannot be granted simply of all that which is signified by the name of Conscience; for the onely office of an Habite, as it is an Habit, is, Inclinare ad prompte agendum, to make one doe a thing readily: but Conscience hath other operations, which belong properly to it, as to Accuse, Comfort, &c.

6 By Iudgement therefore, in the definition of Conscience, (I understand most properly with the best Schoolemen) an act of practicall judgement, proceeding from the Vnderstanding by the power or meanes of a habit. [Iudicium. Noeticum. Dianoeticum.]

7 The acts of judgement are, either a simple apprehension, or a discourse. Whence it may be asked, to which of these belongs Conscience. [Quest.]

It belongs to judgement discoursing, because it cannot [Answ.] doe its act of Accusing, Excusing, Comforting, unlesse it be through the meanes of some third argument, whose force appeareth onely in a Syllogisme, by that which is deduced and concluded out of it.

8 The force and nature of Conscience therfore is contained in such a Syllogisme.

He that liues in sinne, shall dye:

I liue in sinne; Therefore, I shall dye.

Or thus.

Whosoever beleeues in Christ, shall not dye but liue.

I beleeue in Christ: Therefore, I shall not dye but liue.

9 Conscience in regard of the Proposition is called a Light, and a Law; in regard of the Assumption and p. 4conclusion a Witnesse; but in regard of the assumption it is most fitly termed an Index, or a Booke, and in regard of the conclusion, most properly a Iudge.

10 That which doth dictate or giue the proposition is called Synteresis, by the Schoolemen Synderesis. The assumption especially and peculiarly is called Syneidësis, the conclusion is the Krisis, or Iudgement.

11 There be many other Syllogismes which belong to Conscience, as either they doe prooue the proposition of such a principall Syllogisme, or illustrate the conclusion it selfe: but in that Syllogisme alone is contained the whole nature of Conscience. The Proposition treateth of the Law; the Assumption of the fact or state, and the Conclusion of the relation arising from the fact or state, in regard of that Law; The Conclusion either pronounceth one guilty, or giveth spirituall peace and security.

p. 4CHAP. II. Of the Synteresis, or storehouse of Principles.

THat Synteresis out of which the proposition of this syllogisine or the Law of Conscience is taken, is most properly a habit of the understanding, by which wee doe assent unto the principles of morall actions, that is, such actions as are our duty, because God hath willed, or commanded them; whence it hath the name in Greeke from conserving; for through the goodnesse of God, the knowledge of many things which wee ought to doe or shun, are still conserved in mans mind, even after his fall.

That exposition of Durand who dreames that the Greeke word Synteresis signifies a Co◊lection, is too harsh and absurd.

p. 52 Because this Synteresis is an habit, therefore many doe call Conscience, an habit: but it is onely the principle of conscience, neither doth it make up any part of conscience, but only as conscience is in its excercse.