Of the Immortality of Man's Soul

A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Henry More at Christs-Colledge in Cambridge.

Reverend Sir,

I Had answered your desire sooner, but having lent out the Sadduc. Triumph. I staid till now to have ◊ad it returned (being loth to buy another, it costing me 6s.) But I was fain to get another at last, and ◊n the review I find that I have ex◊resly given you my thoughts already ◊f your notion of a Spirit in my Methodus, having noted it in your Book of Atheism, and your Ench. Metaphys. In short. 1. I think you and I are agreed that we cannot conceive of a Spirit unico conceptu, but must have two inadequate conceptions of it: of which one is that which Dr. Glisson De Vita naturae, calls conceptus fundamentalis, and is that which we call Substantia: for we can scarce think of a Virtus formalis, which is not substantiae alicujus virtus, but qua virtus simpliciter existeth of itself; (unless we must so think with some of God.) And though this maketh not an actual composition, as Matter and Form in mixtis, yet intellectually we must take it as a distinct inadequate conceptus.

The other inadequate conceptus i◊ Formal; and I think you and I ar◊ agreed that this is Virtus Una-trina◊ as described by me, viz. Virtus V◊◊talis, vitaliter activa, perceptiva◊ appetitiva, as Dr. Glisson speaks (of which I make three species a◊ described.) And I am my self fa◊ better acquainted with the nature ◊ a Spirit by the essential Virtus formalis, known to us by its acts; (for nothing doth that which it cannot do) than from the notion of substantiality. And yet I dare not say that a self-moving principle is proper to a Spirit. Nor do I consent to Campanella de sensu rerum, and Dr Glisson that would make all things alive by an essentiating form in the very Elements.

I distinguish Natures into Active and Passive; and Passivity is a word that serveth me as well as materiality: But whence the Descensus gravium is, I despair of knowing; and if it be of an innate principle, I call it not therefore a Spirit, because it is but passivorum motus aggregativus ad unionem in quiete, when Spirits motion is vital and so essential to them, that they tend not to union in quiescence, but in everlasting activity; quiescence in inactivity, being as much against their nature as motion against a Stones. So that I think we are agreed of the formal notice of a Spirit in general, and of an intellective, sensitive, and vegetative in specie.

But truly I am at a loss about the conceptus fundamentalis, wherein the true difference lieth between Substantia and Materia. Do we by—Substantia mean a conceptus realis, or only Relative. To say it doth substare accidentibus, speaks but a Relation directly, and leaves the question unanswered, Quid est quod substat accidentibus. To say it is not an Accident, tells us not what it is, but what it is not. To say it doth subsist per se, either saith no more than that it is Ens reale, or else tells us not what it is that doth subsist. Quoad notationem nominis distinct from use▪ doth not materia and substantia signify the same fundamental conceptus? And is not the form the notifying difference? You difference Substance and Matter antecedently to the formal difference by Penetrability & Impenetrability, Indivisibility & Divisibility. But 1. I despair knowing in this life, how far Spiritual Substances are penetrable and indivisible. I grant you such an extension as shall free them from being nothing substantial, and from being Infinite as God is. 2. We grant Spirits a quantitas discreta; they are numerous, individuate; and formae se multiplicant. Generation is the work of Spirits, and not of Bodies. And how can I tell that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, and unite and divide them as well as Matter? But if he should, that would be no destruction of their Species, as the mixtorum dissolutio is; but as every drop of divided Water is Water, & one Candle lighting many, and many joyned in one, are all the same fire; so much more would it be with Spirits, were they united or divided; and their locality and penetrability are past our conceit. 3. But were we sure of what we say therein; these two (Penetrability and Indivisibility) speak but Accidents, though proper; and therefore are no satisfying notice of the notion of Substance Spiritual as distinct from Matter. I am hitherto therefore constrained to contain many thoughts in the following compass.

1. I know Spirits best by the Virtus vitalis formalis una trina.

2. I hold that of Created Spirits substantia as notisying a Basis realis, must be the Conceptus Fundamentalis.

3. The word Immaterial signifying nothing (but a negation) and Materia being by many Antients used in the same sense as we do Substantia, I usually lay by the words.

4. I hold to the distinction of Natures, or Substances Passive and Active.

5. I distinguish Spiritual Substances as such by the Purity of the Substance, besides the Formal Difference.

6. Yet I doubt not but all Created Spirits are somewhat Passive, quia influxum causae primae recipiunt: And you grant them a Spissitude and Extension, which signifie as much as many mean that call them Material. But Custom having made Materia, but specially Corpus, to signifie onely such grosser Substance as the three Passive Elements have, I yield so to say, that Spirits are not Corporeal or Material.

7. Though I run not into the excess of Ludov. Le Grand de Igne (nor of Telesius or Patricius) I would Ignis were better studied: But this Room will not serve me to say what I think of it. But in brief, He that knoweth that Ignis is a Substance, whose Form is the Potentia Activa movendi, illuminandi, calesaciendi, these as received in a gross Passive Body, being but their Accidents oft, but the Igneous Substance in act operating on them, and conceiveth of Spirits, but as Ignis eminenter, that is, of a purer substance than Ignis is, which we best conceive of (next the Formal Virtue) by its similitude, I think knows as much as I can reach of the Substance of Created Spirits. And the Greek Fathers that called Spirits Fire, and distinguished Ignem per formas into Intellective, Sensitive, and Vegetative or Visible Fire, (as it is in Aere Ignito,) allowing an Incomprehensible ◊urity of Substance in the higher above the lower (as in Passives Air hath above Water, &c.) I think did speak tolerably, and as informingly as are the notions of Penetrability and Indivisibility; though perhaps th◊se also may be useful.